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From Territorial to  
Monetary Sovereignty
Katharina Pistor*
State sovereignty is closely intertwined with, but not limited to, 
control over territory and people. It has long been recognized that 
control over monetary affairs is a critical part of genuine sovereignty. 
In this Article, I go a step further and argue that the relevance and 
importance of territorial versus monetary sovereignty has shifted 
in favor of the latter. This shift goes hand in hand with the rise of 
credit-based financial systems. Such systems depend, in the last 
instance, on backstopping by an entity with control over its own 
money supply and no binding survival constraints. Only states with 
monetary sovereignty fit this pattern. All others are de facto more 
like private entities, which by definition cannot manipulate their own 
survival constraint. States can surrender their monetary sovereignty 
directly by adopting another currency or by issuing their own debt in 
foreign currency and under foreign law. They also compromise their 
sovereignty by permitting unlimited capital inflows denominated in 
currencies other than their own. This is because in times of crisis 
they will not be able to rescue the domestic financial system from its 
tendency to self-destruct without subjecting itself to a sovereign debt 
crisis and the implied need to rely on a lifeline from other states or 
supranational entities.
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IntroductIon
This Article explores the transformation of sovereignty in the age of globalization. 
It argues that control over money and finance determines actual sovereignty. 
Viewed in this light, most countries’ sovereignty is compromised. International 
public law treats sovereign states as equal subjects of international law. States 
may be bigger or smaller, older or younger, democratic or autocratic. None 
of this matters for sovereignty as construed by public international law. The 
decisive criterion is effective power over territory and people. Indeed, the most 
rudimentary definition of a state is the organization of power over territory and 
people within that territory.1 Territory determines the boundaries of polities and 
their jurisdiction over different aspects of economic and social life both within 
and between states. Public international law, too, is built around the notion 
that sovereign states are bounded by territory and limits the extraterritorial 
reach of state power by principles of comity and the international law of war. 
The flatness of territorial sovereignty stands in marked contrast to the 
“inherently” hierarchical nature of money and, by implication, of monetary 
sovereignty.2 It goes without saying that only countries that issue their own 
currencies retain control over their monetary policies, a precondition for 
“monetary” sovereignty. Countries that adopt a foreign currency (by dollarizing 
their economies) or join forces with others to adopt a new, common, currency 
(the euro) give up more than control over interest rate policy. They also 
relinquish their ability to address financial crises that are endogenous to a 
financial system built on credit.3 
States may compromise their financial sovereignty even while keeping 
their own money. This is because state money is inextricably intertwined with 
financial assets, or private moneys, that private entities issue, trade, and hold 
1 The so-called “three-element theory.” See GeorG Jellinek, AllGemeine StAAtSlehre 
(1905). More precisely, the Montevideo Convention stipulates that a state is 
a “permanent population with a defined territory, possessing a government 
that has the capacity to enter into relations with other states.” See Montevideo 
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 
19 (entered into force Dec. 26, 1934).
2 See Perry Mehrling, The Inherent Hierarchy of Money, in SociAl FAirneSS And 
economicS: economic eSSAyS in the Spirit oF duncAn Foley 394 (Lance Taylor, 
Armon Rezai & Thomas Michl eds., 2013) (developing the “money view,” which 
treats private and public moneys as part of an integrated money system). 
3 See hymAn p. minSky, The Financial Instability Hypothesis: An Interpretation 
of Keynes and an Alternative to “Standard” Theory, in cAn “it” hAppen AGAin? 
eSSAyS on inStAbility And FinAnce 59 (1982) (originally published in 1977 on 
the tendencies of a financial system to destabilize endogenously). 
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— on the assumption that they can convert them into state money on demand. 
Whether private money can be converted into state money, how fast, and at 
what price are critical issues especially when doubts arise as to whether claims 
created in the past will actually perform. Holders of such claims may be forced 
to write down their value and face a liquidity crunch, if not insolvency, as a 
consequence. If many holders of private moneys experience similar problems, 
the stability of the entire financial system will be at risk, and in the extreme 
it might collapse. At this stage, states and their agents (typically their central 
banks) have to decide whether they want to intervene and rescue the financial 
system from collapse or step aside and watch it self-destruct.
States that do not control their own currency have lost power over this 
critical question, as have states that incur most of their own debt in foreign 
currency, which they do not control. Similarly, if intermediaries that seek 
access to state money need foreign rather than domestic currency to meet 
their obligations, their home state may not be of much help unless it has 
substantial foreign currency reserves or maintains a currency swap line with 
the relevant country whose money is in demand. 
The key thesis of this Article is that if the question of sovereignty was tied 
not to effective control over territory and people but to effective control over 
money, including state and private moneys, most states in this world would 
fail the test of sovereignty. Given the central importance of finance for the 
operation of states, this raises the question of how sovereign most states truly 
are. The only states that may be deemed sovereign in monetary terms are the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, Switzerland, Australia, 
and the People’s Republic of China. All other countries have compromised 
their financial sovereignty. Even as regards countries that have retained their 
monetary sovereignty, one may call into question their ability to exercise it. 
As the great financial crisis (GFC) that has engulfed the world since 2007 
suggests, monetary sovereignty can be compromised by losing control over 
the process of domestic money creation. When private money expansion has 
run its course and a crisis threatens the survival of the system, states can, of 
course, deny liquidity support or bailouts. Yet the political consequences of 
that decision may well force their hands. 
Does this matter? It does if monetary sovereignty is of sufficient import 
to call into question whether states with compromised monetary sovereignty 
are truly sovereign.4 This Article takes the position that it matters hugely. It 
posits that the changing landscape of monetary sovereignty challenges the 
very notion of state sovereignty. This is because access to and control over 
4 Daniel Pilpott, Sovereignty, in StAnFord encyclopediA oF philoSophy (Edward 
N. Zalta ed., 2016), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sovereignty/.
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financial resources is a key source of power in a global economy that has 
torn down entry barriers for capital, even as it builds new fences and walls 
for states to guard against people entering their territory.5 Capital can and 
does roam the globe, but not all states are equally equipped to deal with the 
fallout from financial crises, which are an inevitable byproduct of money 
systems organized around credit.6 
Lack of access to the money needed to serve sovereign debt can also 
compromise a state’s territorial integrity. A recent example is Ukraine in 
2015 when it simultaneously faced a sovereign debt crisis and a threat to its 
territorial integrity by its eastward neighbor. Indeed, the rapid accumulation 
of Ukraine’s debt since 2009 has been attributed to military spending.7 At the 
time, Russian military action may have been still a possibility rather than a 
reality, but the relation between the two countries had already reached a low 
point. The fact that access to international lending markets can determine the 
fate of sovereign states is nothing new. Funding wars has been a major motive 
for issuing sovereign debt ever since England financed its wars with France 
by chartering the Bank of England in 1694 and using it to issue sovereign 
bonds.8 However, with the growing complexity of domestic finance and 
increasing interdependence of global financial systems, access to finance has 
become a central issue not only in times of war. Every severe financial crisis 
challenges sovereign power in the country where it happens to break out. Every 
crisis puts to a test the ability of states to rescue the domestic money system 
without recourse to external help. Some countries can help themselves and 
others can’t. External help always comes with strings attached and constrains 
autonomous decision making. 
These strings may be lifted once countries have repaid their debt or 
implemented the demanded policies. They may therefore be dismissed as 
merely temporary. However, what appears to be a temporary measure masks 
deeper, structural features of the global money system. It is an inherently 
5 Waldron in this issue posits the thought-provoking question whether sovereigns 
have the power to exclude persons that are not acting as agents (troops) of foreign 
states from their territory. See Jeremy Waldron, Exclusion: Property Analogies 
in the Immigration Debate, 18 theoreticAl inquirieS l. 469 (2017). 
6 See hymAn p. minSky, StAbilizinG An unStAble economy (1986) (discussing 
capitalist economic systems as financial systems based on credit finance).
7 See Elaine Moore, Explainer: Ukraine Debt Crisis, Fin. timeS, July 23, 2015, https://
www.ft.com/content/2d058776-312b-11e5-8873-775ba7c2ea3d?siteedition=intl.
8 For an account of the early history of the Bank of England, see bruce G. 
cArrutherS, city oF cApitAl: politicS And mArketS in the enGliSh FinAnciAl 
revolution (1996); and Stephen FrAnciS quinn, bAnkinG beFore the bAnk: 
london’S unreGulAted GoldSmith-bAnkerS, 1660-1694 (1994).
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hierarchical system that links assets, intermediaries, and countries in ways that 
predetermine winners and losers in times of crisis. One has to be at or close 
to the top to come out of a crisis relatively unscathed; those on the periphery 
will be the first to absorb the losses. 
The rest of this Article is organized as follows. Part I develops the conceptual 
framework for the argument and relates it to debates in the literature. Part II 
argues the case that the rise of money and the integration of money systems 
globally have transformed sovereignty. Part III pitches territorial sovereignty 
against monetary sovereignty to further sharpen the argument. Part IV discusses 
the normative implications of compromised monetary sovereignty for the 
ability of people to self-govern. Part V concludes. 
I. rethInkIng Monetary SovereIgnty
Monetary sovereignty has not been central to debates about sovereignty. To the 
extent that it has been addressed at all, it is acknowledged that sovereign states 
have the power to issue their own currency and manage their own financial 
systems.9 Once subsumed as a facet of the unified concept of sovereignty, 
the argument follows familiar steps for explaining sovereignty internally 
and externally: states may delegate part of their sovereignty by entering into 
international agreements with other states. They may even relinquish their own 
currency and transfer monetary policy, as the member states of the European 
Union, which adopted the euro as their common currency, have done. As 
long as delegation takes place within existing constitutional mandates, such 
measures will not compromise sovereignty. Further, in the external realm 
sovereignty shall not be compromised by other states, but neither shall one 
state use its sovereign powers in ways that inflict harm on other states.10 
There are two problems with this account. First, it embraces a very narrow 
view of sovereignty that is limited to state money and state action. Second 
and related, it treats money as perfectly analogous to territory. Just as the 
sovereign’s territory can be clearly distinguished from land and ownership of 
land, so state money, the legal tender, is assumed to be clearly distinguishable 
from private money, the financial instruments that private entities issue, hold, 
and trade. The sovereign sets the rules of the game11 and private parties pursue 
9 See Claus D. Zimmermann, The Concept of Monetary Sovereignty Revisited, 
24 eur J. int’l l. 797 (2013) for a useful summary of the debate. 
10 See id. at 810. 
11 This, of course, is Douglass North’s widely followed definition of “institutions.” 
See douGlASS c. north, inStitutionS, inStitutionAl chAnGe And economic 
perFormAnce (1990).
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their own goals within these constraints. However, while control over land 
and territory have effectively been separated into a world of private property 
rights on one hand, and public domestic and international law governing 
territory and territorial borders on the other, money cannot be neatly parsed 
in this fashion. In short, public and private moneys are part of an integrated, 
hierarchical money system, both domestically and globally.12 
Entities that can relax their own survival constraint occupy the apex of this 
system. Only entities that can impose their own liabilities on others can do 
so. States are paradigmatic examples of such entities, but as discussed below, 
not the only ones. This quality ensures that state-issued legal tender serves as 
a reference for all private moneys, which are priced in public money, and as 
an asset of last resort whenever the risk of holding money issued by private 
and thus fallible entities becomes too high. The location of private entities in 
a hierarchical system is determined by their access to state money, the only 
safe asset in times of crisis. 
A state that controls its own currency can produce it in unlimited amounts. 
That is the source of its backstopping capacity. However, unrestrained use of 
this power will undermine its credibility as the guardian of public money’s 
safety. States with a track record of sustained high- or even hyper-inflation 
are a case in point; everyone will flee from their money, exchange it for other 
currencies or for “real” assets that may not be tradable but promise more 
lasting value. 
To appreciate the interconnectedness of private and public money systems 
it is useful to conceptualize our domestic and global money systems as sets of 
interlocking balance sheets.13 What constitute one person’s or entity’s assets 
are another person’s or entity’s liability. The basic rule in a market economy 
is that in principle all must balance their assets and liabilities. Those failing 
to do so will be liquidated and their assets reallocated to more efficient users.14 
Critically, this auction-block rule does not apply to states. It is sometimes 
said that states cannot default, because they can always print their own money. 
Clearly, this can apply only to states that control their own money. Sovereigns 
with foreign exchange exposure can and often do default; yet a default does 
12 This is not how modern finance theory sees it. For a critique of this view 
and a call to take into account the actual operation of the money system, see 
Perry Mehrling, Minsky and Modern Finance: The Case of Long Term Capital 
Management, 26 J. portFolio mGmt. 81 (2000).
13 perry mehrlinG, the new lombArd Street: how the Fed becAme the deAler 
oF lASt reSort (2011); Mehrling, supra note 2. 
14 This is the basic rationale for liquidation in bankruptcy. See douGlAS G. bAird, 
the elementS oF bAnkruptcy (1993).
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not trigger the demise of these states. The principle of state sovereignty and 
their ability to commit the future productivity of their economies insulates 
even insolvent states from liquidation. It follows that sovereigns do not 
operate under a binding survival constraint.15 In contrast, private entities do, 
unless they have a direct or indirect lifeline to a sovereign. If the conditions 
for the lifeline are set ex ante and held firm even in times of crisis, states 
maintain the upper hand over private entities. If private entities can compel 
sovereign states to support them ex post, private entities gain the upper hand 
over states. In short, monetary sovereignty can be impaired not only by acts 
of other states, but also, and perhaps primarily, by private actors.
The above analysis renders at least two important implications. First, 
money systems are not flat but hierarchical. Moreover, one’s position in this 
hierarchical system is determined by the relative elasticity of one’s survival 
constraint. Second, law is central to the organization of money systems, 
domestic and global. Every IOU is a contract, which can be dressed up to 
enjoy priority rights against the world with the help of property and collateral 
law and protected from unwanted creditors by employing trust or entity law.16 
Law thereby helps to scale money systems from settings in which mutual 
monitoring is sufficient to ensure which commitments are made, to national 
or global markets where anonymity makes mutual monitoring infeasible. 
Law’s scaling power is a function of the coercive powers of states. 
Yet, the power of law can also help destabilize the system when it turns 
out that not all enforceable claims will indeed generate the expected returns. 
This is the essence of the “Law-Finance Paradox.”17 All claims to future pay 
entail a speculative element, because nobody can know for sure what the future 
might hold. Frank Knight has coined the term “fundamental uncertainty” to 
capture this basic insight.18 The more market participants rely on credible 
legal commitments and equate them with predictability of actual returns, the 
larger but also the more volatile the system becomes. Once defaults mount, 
and they typically begin to mount on the periphery, every market participant 
15 This is the term used by minSky, supra note 6. In a similar vein, János Kornai 
uses the term soft and hard budget constraints. States and public entities operate 
under a soft budget constraint as they can shift liabilities to others, but private 
entities operate under a hard budget constraint since they are, in principle, not 
able to do so. See JánoS kornAi, the SociAliSt SyStem: the politicAl economy 
oF communiSm (1992); János Kornai et al., Understanding the Soft Budget 
Constraint, 41 J. econ. literAture 1095 (2003).
16 See generally Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J. comp. econ. 
315 (2013). 
17 See id. 
18 FrAnk h. niGht, riSk, uncertAinty And proFit (1921).
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will necessarily seek to protect itself by calling in claims against others and 
rebalancing assets that have lost value. If all do so at the same time the system 
will self-destruct. Retreat from there is possible, but only by compromising 
the very pillars on which the system rests. It requires the relaxation of the 
full force of the law by suspending existing commitments or by offering state 
money (liquidity) where none is owed. Relaxing if not suspending the full 
force of the law undermines the credibility of legal commitments needed to 
scale financial systems to size. 
An obvious response to the two points made previously is to say that 
sovereigns can and should constrain private parties. They should restrict their 
moneymaking activities and not allow them to become too dangerous to the 
stability of the system. Indeed, many states have done so in the past and every 
crisis brings about another effort to do so. The form these constraints take 
varies and may include limitations on issuing notes, the rules governing the 
composition of balance sheets, or constraints on the size of financial regulation 
or the scope of their operations in terms of both geography and subject matter.19 
Notably, none of these constraints has been immune to erosion.
It is virtually impossible to write complete laws.20 Every legal constraint 
therefore necessarily leaves gaps that can and will be exploited for gain. The 
forces of competition push every system of private moneys towards greater 
risk-taking and more imaginative exploitation of gaps in the regulatory 
scaffolding.21 Hyman Minsky has described this trend as follows.22 Financial 
systems may start out funding predominantly projects that are highly likely to 
generate the expected returns at a certain future date. Competitive pressure, 
however, will lead more and more market participants to relax the conditions 
19 For a comprehensive overview of the legal constraints that existed in the United 
States after the new deal, but were lifted over time, see Arthur E. Wilmarth, 
Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry 1975-2000: 
Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 u. ill. l. rev. 215. 
For historical comparisons of banking in the United States and in Germany, 
see Charles W. Calomiris, The Costs of Rejecting Universal Banking: American 
Finance in the German Mirror, 1870-1914, in coordinAtion And inFormAtion: 
hiStoricAl perSpectiveS on the orGAnizAtion oF enterpriSe 257 (Naomi R. 
Lamoreaux & Daniel M.G. Raff eds., 1995). More generally, on different models 
of banking and finance in modern Europe, see Richard Tilly, Universal Banking 
in Historical Perspective, 154 J. inSt. & theoreticAl econ. 7 (1998).
20 See Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Incomplete Law, 35 J. int’l l. & pol. 
931 (2003).
21 See minSky, supra note 6, for a comprehensive treatment of endogenous 
destabilization of money systems. 
22 Id. at 225-26.
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for lending. They will also invest in projects that have a substantially high 
probability of requiring a rollover of debt, as they won’t be able to deliver 
when debts become due. That he calls “speculative” finance. For the most 
aggressive lenders, speculative finance is not enough. They are willing to 
fund projects that almost certainly will need refinancing and charge higher 
interests for them. This he calls “Ponzi” finance — after the famous Ponzi 
scheme, where investors are duped into committing funds, which are used to 
pay back others who have done so earlier — with no investments ever made.23 
In theory, sovereigns might respond to this by filling gaps left in the 
regulatory scaffolding as they observe the gradual destabilization of the 
system. In practice, they rarely do so. One reason is that governments need 
to fund themselves. Debt finance often seems more palatable than tax finance, 
especially in democracies where electorates frequently demand both social 
benefits and low taxes, and punish governments that do not deliver. Moreover, 
governments benefit from growth, and credit helps fuel growth. Reliance on 
public and private debt finance appears to have increased after inflationary 
practices have been curtailed.24 Insulating the making of money from direct 
state control, however, is only part of the story. The other part is ensuring 
that the production of money is not taken over by the private sector, which 
invariably will seek full conversion into public money.25 
Last but not least, unlike land, the most immobile of all assets, money is 
not confined to territory. States can impose capital controls for inbound or 
outbound capital flows, but they are difficult to police and have been largely 
abandoned when fixed exchange regimes were replaced by floating ones. 
Capital controls were put in place after World War II to complement a global 
monetary system that was anchored once more in the gold standard. Under 
the Bretton Woods system, the U.S. dollar was pegged to gold and all other 
major currencies were pegged to the dollar.26 However, this system hardly ever 
operated in its pure form. Private parties sought to sidestep capital controls 
23 The closest to this in recent times has been the Madoff phenomenon. 
24 Inflation rates increased in most developed economies over the 1970s, leading 
to concerted efforts to impose rigid inflation targets.
25 GretA A. krippner, cApitAlizinG on criSiS (2011) makes this point for the United 
States, showing that the imposition of high interest rates under chairman Volcker 
to contain inflation went hand in hand with the lowering of capital controls and 
the influx of foreign capital to fund the government. 
26 See bArry eichenGreen, GlobAlizinG cApitAl: A hiStory oF the internAtionAl 
monetAry SyStem (2d ed. 2008) for a historical exploration of different monetary 
and currency regimes. 
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by using currency swaps and similar legal devices.27 Governments too found 
it difficult to operate under the constraints it imposed. The United States in 
particular found it impossible to pursue its overseas military strategies while 
facing increasing demands for gold conversion by European allies after their 
economies had regained their footing in the postwar period. In 1971 the 
United States abandoned the gold standard and allowed the currency to float. 
The demise of Bretton Woods ushered in an era not only of floating exchange 
rates, but also of free capital flows. There was no need for governments to 
control the flow of capital if the benchmark money, the currencies, was priced 
effectively by the market. The regime shift created a new arena for private 
moneys. Private entities began to create and disseminate assets that were 
deemed as safe as state money but offered higher yields. The trick was to 
use asset backing rather than liquidity backstopping to ensure their safety, at 
least so the argument went to thwart regulatory interventions.28 Asset-backed 
securities (ABS) became prominent in the United States in the early 1970s 
as a way to stimulate home ownership. 
At first, only government-sponsored entities (GSEs) created and lent 
credibility to them.29 The next step was to use ABS to back another class of 
assets derived from them, such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and 
their squared and cubed variations, or credit default swaps (CDSs) that were 
used to insure the value of the underlying claims. These assets were created 
and funded for the most part outside the formal banking system, although 
banks were deeply involved in them.30 They did this through off-balance sheet 
structures (the so-called special purpose vehicles, or SPVs) that insulated 
them from regulatory oversight and protected investors in these structures 
against the credit risk associated with banks.31 The proliferation of these assets 
27 The origins of capital swaps as a means to circumvent capital controls are 
mentioned in mehrlinG, supra note 13. 
28 See GilliAn tett, Fool’S Gold: how the bold dreAm oF A SmAll tribe At 
J.p. morGAn wAS corrupted by wAll Street And unleAShed A cAtAStrophe 
(2009) (discussing the negotiations between JP Morgan and regulators about 
regulatory oversight over CDOs).
29 For an excellent summary of the role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in residential 
mortgage-backed securities, see W. Scott Frame et al., The Rescue of Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, 29 J. econ. perSp. 25 (2015).
30 The best evidence for this is that issuance of derivatives was concentrated in the 
hands of five major banks. See Bruce G. Carruthers, Diverging Derivatives: Law, 
Governance and Modern Financial Markets, 41 J. comp. econ. 386 (2013).
31 The keyword here is “bankruptcy remoteness.” This was achieved by placing 
assets into trusts, which in turn issued certificates or notes to investors. For an 
overview of these securitization practices, see Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy 
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escaped regulatory oversight for two reasons: They were exempted from such 
oversight in the United States by the famous 1974 “Treasury Amendment” to 
the act that established the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
— the agency in charge of overseeing commodities and futures markets. 
Moreover, the assets thus created were marketable in foreign jurisdictions, 
because they had opened their borders and legal systems to assets created 
under foreign law.32
In short, the shift from the gold standard to fiat money in the realm of state 
moneys had its complement in the private sector in the shift from formal banking 
to parallel banking: the expansion of structured finance and the organization 
of off-balance sheet structures to shift risk and avoid regulatory charges.33 In 
a world freed from capital controls, these instruments too can travel freely — 
and they did. On the downside, the diffusion of ABS and credit derivatives 
(CDOs and CDSs) also helped spread contagion when the crisis hit. It is 
certainly the case that “banks live globally but die nationally,”34 as the former 
Bank of England governor Mervyn King has quipped. But equally important, 
financial assets, or moneys, produced under the laws of one sovereign can 
wreak havoc on the territory of another. If and when they do, that sovereign 
faces the challenge of stabilizing its financial system. This is when it turns 
out that some can, and others cannot. Private money let loose globally thus 
can bring sovereigns to their knees. They need not have delegated sovereignty 
consciously; all they have to do is to open their borders to free capital flows. 
of Asset Securitization, 1 StAn. J.l. buS. & Fin. 133 (1994). But see Kenneth 
C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial 
Product Development, 29 cArdozo l. rev. 1553 (2008) (offering a critique 
of securitization from the perspective of legal doctrine and black letter law).
32 The legal changes required went beyond simply lifting capital controls. Countries 
had to recognize the creation of assets under foreign law, which they had been 
reluctant to do in the past out of sovereignty considerations. A detailed analysis 
of the “choice of law” principles and how they changed over time would go 
beyond the scope of this Article.
33 For an excellent account on the expansion and operation of the shadow banking 
system, see Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song Shin, The Shadow Banking System: 
Implications for Financial Regulation (Staff Report, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 
Working Paper No. 382, 2009).
34 See Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, Banking: From Bagheot to 
Basel and Back Again, The Second Bagehot Lecture Buttonwood Gathering (Oct. 
25, 2010), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/historicpubs/
speeches/2010/speech455.pdf. 
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II. SovereIgnty tranSforMed
The globalization of money, in particular private money, is transforming 
sovereignty. Territorial sovereignty still matters. Yet even states that exert 
effective control over territory and people may find themselves on the periphery 
of a global money system that is not flat, but hierarchical. This has serious 
repercussions for their ability to act with the autonomy and authority to self-
govern that sovereignty is meant to convey. 
At the heart of the problem lies the fact that the world has embraced the 
free flow of capital but has not created mechanisms for sharing the costs of 
crises that will inevitably erupt from time to time. Instead of cost sharing, 
countries where a crisis happens to erupt are saddled with its fallout. It is 
often assumed that only countries with “bad” institutions, that is, countries 
that do not effectively protect private property rights and enforce contracts, 
are prone to crisis.35 Viewed in this light, there is nothing wrong with forcing 
them to shoulder the costs. These countries should simply learn the lesson 
and build better institutions for the future. However, the GFC has turned this 
argument on its head. The eye of the storm was in the countries that had been 
heralded as models for best practice governance of finance, the United States 
and the United Kingdom. 
In hierarchically organized systems, crises tend to erupt on the periphery 
and work their way up to the core of the system. Ordinary households and 
entities without access to credit lines from major banks or the government 
will find that at some point they can no longer roll over their debt. They will 
have no choice but to exit through liquidation, because their balance sheets 
are too small to absorb a serious downward adjustment of the value of their 
assets.36 Intermediaries and dealers further up in the hierarchy may still believe 
they are safe, but not safe enough to help those below. They will discover 
that they too have a binding survival constraint when they can no longer roll 
over their debt; and so forth. 
35 This, certainly, has been the perspective of the International Monetary Fund in 
the aftermath of the East Asian Financial crisis, when it created its “Financial 
Sector Assessment Programs” that were used to assess the quality of legal and 
regulatory institutions in member countries. These efforts continue today. For 
details, see Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), int’l monetAry Fund, 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/fsap/fsap.aspx (last updated Apr. 3, 2017). 
36 See, e.g., Matthew P. Dreannan, Income Inequality: Not Your Usual Suspect 
in Understanding the Financial Crash and Great Recession, 18 theoreticAl 
inquirieS l. 97 (2017) (showing that inequality among households was a major 
cause of the GFC, and that a major part of households’ debt was caused by 
elementary expenses and necessities).
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When self-preservation becomes the order of the day, the system will 
contract from the periphery towards the center, leaving defaults and entities 
scrambling for another lifeline in its wake. Once the flight to safety, as it is 
commonly called — that is, the attempt to exchange assets that no longer 
promise the expected returns and may even default for others that do — 
engulfs the core of the system, we have a full-blown crisis. At this point, the 
only safe asset is the state money, and only few have access to it on demand: 
regulated banks with access to reserves held at central banks, the discount 
window or emergency lending facilities made available to them, and, of 
course, the state itself. 
This model of a hierarchical money system describes not only domestic, 
but also the global financial system. Recall that stress began to build in 2006 
as housing prices flattened out, putting an end to house flipping and easy 
refinancing.37 By the summer of 2007, the stress that had built on the periphery 
claimed its first victims among financial intermediaries: the French bank 
BNP Paribas, the German IKB, and the English Northern Rock were rescued 
from the brink by a government bailout. The first two had entered the credit 
derivatives markets late in the game, and aggressively so, and neither had 
a capital base sufficiently large to sustain the losses they never expected to 
incur. The latter had funded mortgages by refinancing liabilities on interbank 
lending markets, which began to dry up in the summer of 2007.38 In the fall of 
2007 even the largest financial intermediaries had realized that they needed 
fresh capital. Finding it difficult to raise capital on private markets, they went, 
hat in hand, to the sovereign wealth funds sponsored by governments with 
substantial foreign currency revenue from oil or exports, which they invested 
in global markets: Qatar, Singapore, China, as well as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, 
and South Korea.39
Even well capitalized sovereign wealth funds, however, were not willing to 
put too much of their capital at risk to save the global financial system. When 
37 The New York Fed has put together a crisis timeline. See Financial Turmoil 
Timeline (June 2007 - November 2007), Fed. reServe bAnk oF n.y., https://
www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/global_economy/Crisis_
Timeline.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2017). Note, however, that IKB’s failure is 
not included. For a more comprehensive timeline, see Credit Crisis Timeline, 
credit writedown, https://www.creditwritedowns.com/credit-crisis-timeline/ 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2017). 
38 For a comprehensive analysis of the failure of Northern Rock, see House of 
Commons, Treasury Committee, The Run on the Rock: Fifth Report of Session 
2007-08 (2008).
39 For a detailed account of the investment patterns and their rationale, see Katharina 
Pistor, Global Network Finance, 37 J. comp. econ. 552 (2009).
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Bear Stearns failed in March of 2008, the New York Fed brokered a deal that 
had JP Morgan Chase take over the smaller investment bank with financial 
help from the Fed. In August, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two privately 
owned but government-sponsored entities that had promoted the market for 
securitized mortgages were taken into conservatorship.40 In September, the 
attempt to arrange another shotgun marriage for a failing investment bank, 
Lehman Brothers, failed and the bank was forced into bankruptcy when no 
willing suitor was found.41 What followed was a full-blown run on the assets 
and entities as every entity in the system took a fresh look at its balance sheets, 
enforced outstanding claims and collateral calls against counter parties, and 
shed assets that were declining in value. Left to its own, such a downward 
spiral in asset prices can bring down an entire financial system. We cannot 
know for sure whether it would have done so in 2008, but the threat of an 
imminent collapse triggered responses from central banks and governments 
around the world.
Central banks extended liquidity programs, first to primary dealers and 
regulated banks and then to ever more entities, including money market funds 
and other intermediaries that previously had enjoyed a special status as entities 
that offered de facto banking services without being regulated as banks or 
paying upfront deposit insurance. Legislatures passed bailout packages for 
financial intermediaries. When the United Kingdom came out with its decision 
to bail out its major banks, many other countries followed suit. They feared 
that failing to do so would trigger a run on their banks, as they would be 
deemed less safe than competitors with full government backing. 
Bailouts were politically contentious wherever they occurred. However, 
not in all countries did a bailout of banks morph into a sovereign debt crisis. 
It happened in Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain (also known as 
the PIIGS), but not in Austria or Germany. They all belong to the Eurozone, 
but only some had to ask for outside help when the financial crisis got out 
of control. Two factors help explain the difference: a credit boom fueled by 
capital flows from some countries and into others,42 and the lack of an effective 
backstopping mechanism for refinancing sovereign debt in the Eurozone. In 
40 For details, see Frame et al., supra note 29. See also Robert C. Hockett & Saule 
T. Omarova, “Private” Means to “Public” Ends: Governments as Market Actors, 
15 theoreticAl inquirieS l. 53, 60 (2014).
41 See Financial Turmoil Timeline, supra note 37. 
42 Dirk Schoenmaker, Stabilising and Healing the Irish Banking System: Policy 
Lessons, Paper Prepared for the CBI-CEPR-IMF Conference (Jan. 12, 2015), 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2014/ireland/pdf/Schoenmaker_
IrishBanking.pdf (providing data on the financial boom that preceded the crisis). 
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theory, even a country without its own currency can keep its financial system 
afloat as long as it can refinance its own debt. For Ireland, this task fell on 
the European Central Bank (ECB), which refused to offer a helping hand. 
To the contrary, it threatened to cut back emergency loans in the fall of 2010 
should Ireland fail to assume all of the debt of its banks.43 
Ireland found itself caught in a web of legal constraints that eroded its 
monetary sovereignty. Relevant treaty law of the European Union prohibits 
member states from constraining inward or outward capital flows.44 Ireland 
therefore could not have possibly stopped the inflow of capital that saw the 
size of assets held by Irish banks triple in only six years, from 2002 to 2008.45 
It is not clear that Irish regulators perceived the expansion as a potential threat 
or that it had wanted to take measures to stem the inflow. The point is that it 
would not have been allowed to do so had it tried. 
One might think that a system that collectively subscribes to free capital 
flows would also create mechanisms to share the costs of such a system. Not 
so in the EU. Prior to the GFC, no mechanisms were in place to mitigate 
costs for countries where such a crisis might erupt. Moreover, the role of 
the ECB as a potential backstop for the system was unclear as a matter of 
law.46 While this issue has now been settled largely in favor of the ECB’s 
power to offer backstopping and thus emergency lending, this came too 
late for Ireland. Interestingly, it did not change the role of the ECB when 
it faced the decision whether to continue emergency loans to Greece in the 
summer of 2015 when the country was trying to renegotiate its debt with the 
Troika.47 In sum, Ireland (along with other members of the Eurozone) lost 
43 See Martin Hellwig, Notstand oder Erpressung? [State of Emergency or 
Blackmail?], dAS hAndelSblAtt, July 3, 2015, at 64 (drawing parallels between 
the role of the ECB in the case of Ireland in the fall of 2010 and in Greece in 
the summer of 2015. In the latter case the ECB did indeed withdraw emergency 
loans, forcing the closure of the country’s banking system.).
44 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
art. 63, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
45 Schoenmaker, supra note 42, at 6 tbl. 1 and accompanying text (suggesting that 
the bulk of the asset expansion was funded from capital coming in from the 
EU). 
46 See TFEU, supra note 44, arts. 119, 123(1), 127(1)-(2); Protocol (No. 4) on the 
Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central 
Bank, arts. 17-24, Oct. 26, 2012, C 326/230 (preventing the ECB from engaging 
in outright fiscal financing).
47 See Case C-62/14, Gauweiler v. Deutscher Bundestag, 2014 E.C.R. I, http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-62/14; Press Release, Court of Justice of the 
European Union, The OMT Programme Announced by the ECB in September 
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sovereignty on two counts: it had no means of defending its financial system 
against capital inflows; and it had no viable backstopping (much less cost 
sharing) mechanism to mitigate a crisis once it erupted. The major difference 
between these countries and other members of the Eurozone was that they 
were recipients of foreign capital flows, whereas others (Germany, France, 
and Austria) housed the intermediaries that exported them. This allowed the 
latter to externalize the costs of their financing model.48
The case illustrates the circumstances of countries that find themselves on 
the periphery of the global financial system. But Ireland or the “PIIGs” are 
not alone. The list of financial crises in emerging markets is long. As in the 
Irish case, these countries faltered when first their intermediaries and then 
the sovereigns themselves found themselves unable to refinance their debt. 
There is, of course, no legal right to be rescued when bets made in the past 
do not work out. However, these bets take place in a context where different 
sovereign nations have highly uneven access to refinancing opportunities. 
Access to safe assets is controlled by the issuer of such assets, the central 
banks at the core of the financial system. How they use these powers is nicely 
illustrated by the currency swap lines they have created. At first, these were 
ad hoc measures among the central banks that control the world’s leading 
currencies: dollar, euro, frank, pound, and yen.49 Some other countries also 
received an ad hoc swap line — but only if their pain posed a potential threat 
to the issuer of a leading currency.50 
After the GFC had subsided, the leading central banks (augmented by 
Canada whose former central bank governor had become governor of the 
Bank of England) declared that they would make these swap lines permanent. 
Remarkably, these six central banks took this decision by invoking their powers 
to ensure price stability in accordance with their own domestic legislation. 
No one challenged their power to decide who should be able to join the club 
and who should be left out. In taking this politically charged decision, they 
2012 Is Compatible with EU Law (June 16, 2015), http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/
upload/docs/application/pdf/2015-06/cp150070en.pdf. 
48 See also Hellwig, supra note 43 (arguing that Irish taxpayers effectively paid 
the claims German banks had against Irish banks).
49 See Maurice Obstfeld et al., Financial Instability, Reserves, and Central Bank 
Swap Lines in the Panic of 2008, 99 Am. econ. rev. 480 (2009) (lauding the 
swap lines as evidence of enhanced cooperation among major central banks). 
50 See Brad Sester, Where Is My Swap Line? And Will the Diffusion of Financial 
Power Balkanize the Global Response to a Broadening Crisis?, Follow the 
money bloG (Oct. 18, 2008), http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2008/10/18/where-is-
my-swap-line-and-will-the-diffusion-of-financial-power-balkanize-the-global-
response-to-the-broadening-crises/.
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further entrenched the global hierarchy of moneys. Entities with access to 
one of these central banks will also have guaranteed access to the currencies 
the other five central banks issue. Entities without access can only plead for 
help in the middle of a crisis.51 
III. the PolItIcal econoMy of Money
Territorial sovereignty is based on control over land and the people residing 
on it. How exactly control is organized is irrelevant for the recognition of 
territorial sovereignty. It may vary internally, but in the external relation to 
other states sovereignty is flat. Territorial sovereignty is compatible with 
feudalistic, autocratic, republican, and democratic orders. The locus of “the 
sovereign” might shift from the King to parliament, even to “we the people” 
or the demos, without affecting the status of territorially bounded sovereignty. 
Sovereignty with its roots in the territorial nation-states can even engage in 
extraterritorial or supranational governance, provided that they are sufficiently 
legitimated under existing constitutional law.52 Territorial sovereignty is also 
compatible with different forms of land ownership. Land may be owned by 
the state, leased out, or owned privately. This has no effect on the public claim 
to territorial sovereignty directed against intruders from the outside. Clearly, 
states can use their powers to respond to internal challengers and alter the 
rules that govern their ownership. The simple point is that private ownership 
and public sovereignty are distinct and can coexist as such.
In contrast, in credit-based financial systems public and private moneys are 
necessarily intertwined. This follows from the inherent hierarchical structure 
of money systems.53 History is full of examples of systems with private money 
that lacked public backstopping. Such systems often thrived for a while, but 
the logic of competition drives them towards instability. Consider only the 
era of “free” banking in the United States, when state-chartered banks freely 
issued notes that were convertible into dollars pegged to gold – and yet, 
neither the banks nor the states who chartered them controlled the ultimate 
money supply. The end result was that banks frequently collapsed.54 Private 
51 See Katharina Pistor, Central Banking’s New Club Class, proJect SyndicAte 
(Dec. 2, 2013), https://www.project-syndicate.org/columnist/katharina-pistor. 
52 For a powerful argument on how to sustain constitutional sovereignty in the 
age of globalization, see JeAn l. cohen, GlobAlizAtion And SovereiGnty: 
rethinkinG leGAlity And conStitutionAliSm (2012). Note, however, that she 
does not address the question of monetary sovereignty.
53 See Mehrling, supra note 2. 
54 Richard Sylla, Monetary Innovation in America, 42 J. econ. hiSt. 20 (1982).
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money makes bets on a future that is inherently unknown and unknowable. 
If and when that future turns out to differ significantly from the assumptions 
that underlie the bets made in the past, even the most credible commitments 
will unravel — and with them the entities that made them and the money in 
which they were coined. 
Large-scale financial systems evolved only with the rise of nation-states 
and the explicit or implicit guarantees they afforded these systems.55 They 
are invariably born out of sin: an implicit pact between rulers and financiers 
to stand in for one another.56 Financiers fund rulers and in return rulers help 
refinance their financiers. In recent years, countries like Greece, Spain, or 
Italy have been singled out as examples of this original sin and attempts have 
been made to sever the umbilical cord between states and banks by shifting 
the supervision of banks from the nation-state to the European level.57 Perhaps 
these countries have allowed too cozy a relation to develop between their 
governments and their banks. Yet large-scale financial systems develop only 
in the presence of effective backstopping. And for reasons explained above, 
effective backstopping can come only from public entities, or states. Indeed, 
countries without the bargain between rulers and financiers (“merchants and 
kings” in the language of Fernand Braudel58) have failed to develop a major 
financial system.59 
It is widely held that England’s advance since the eighteenth century rests 
in large parts on the Crown’s commitment to respect the property rights of 
its subjects, including the rights of its own creditors.60 Indeed, as Christine 
Desan has shown, English rulers were limited in using a common trick to 
55 See also minSky, supra note 6 (discussing at length the phenomenon of “big 
government”).
56 For an early example of foreign financiers funding the Spanish empire and relaxing 
the repayment obligations to ensure future business, see Martti Koskenniemi, 
Empire and International Law: The Real Spanish Contribution, 61 u. toronto 
l.J. 1 (2011).
57 For a summary of the design and operation of the European Banking Union, see 
Single Supervisory Mechanism, eur. cen. bAnk, https://www.bankingsupervision.
europa.eu/about/thessm/html/index.en.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2016).
58 FernAnd brAudel, SoziAlGeSchichte deS 15.-18. JAhrhundertS: der hAndel 
[SociAl hiStory oF the 15th-18th centurieS: trAde] (1991).
59 See AbhiShek chAtterJee, FinAnciAl property riGhtS under coloniAliSm: Some 
counterFActuAl poSSibilitieS (2014) (developing this argument for colonial 
India). 
60 Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The 
Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century 
England, 49 J. econ. hiSt. 803 (1989).
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deal with financial constraints by debasing their metallic currencies. English 
landlords depended on the value derived from rents paid on land they had 
leased; and they had a say in matters of money and taxation.61 This, however, 
did not prevent the Crown and its financiers from exploring other avenues 
for dealing with funding shortages.
Expanding the source of moneys rather than debasement became the 
preferred strategy. This practice predates the creation of the Bank of England 
in 1694 and involved tax collectors, goldsmiths, and record keepers at the 
accountants at the Treasury.62 In principle, tax obligations were owed in the 
official coinage, also referred to as the means of final settlement. Yet for periods 
of time, bookkeepers accepted sovereign debt (wooden tallies) to extinguish 
tax obligations. The scheme was intermediated by goldsmiths who bought 
sovereign debt and used these assets to back their own notes that were issued 
to investors and widely used as means of pay. Tax collectors accepted the 
goldsmith notes from merchants, traders, and others who held them as safe 
investments and as means of pay in their own right. After all, they were easier 
to carry around than heavy metallic coinage. The tax collectors then presented 
the notes to goldsmiths, who exchanged them for the tallies that represented 
state debt. The tax collector could wait until the debt matured and could be 
exchanged into coins. However, the promise of full convertibility frequently 
proved good enough for accountants to extinguish the debt.63 
The scheme was a win-win for all concerned. The sovereign found willing 
takers for its debt. The goldsmiths enhanced their asset base against which they 
issued their own notes. The high quality of public debt with designated income 
streams made the goldsmiths’ notes all the more desirable. The takers of the 
goldsmiths’ notes also benefited. The availability of more moneys lubricated 
the credit market and facilitated payments. But there was a downside. The 
scheme had to collapse if either the Crown or a significant number of goldsmiths 
defaulted. The investors on the periphery of the system were the first ones to 
fall when tax collectors would impose a “coins only” rule when faced with 
the risk that their debt (collected in lieu of coins) was no longer convertible.
The Bank of England, established in 1694, institutionalized this scheme of 
multiple moneys used to back one another’s credibility. The Bank was chartered 
by the Crown as a legal entity with the power to own assets and contract in 
61 chriStine deSAn, mAkinG money: coin, currency, And the cominG oF cApitAliSm 
(2015).
62 Stephen Francis Quinn, Banking Before the Bank: London’s Unregulated 
Goldsmith-Bankers, 1660-1694 (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. 
of Ill.), http://hdl.handle.net/2142/20001.
63 See id. at 111.
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its own name.64 The goldsmiths became the Bank’s private shareholders with 
limited liability, which created a buffer between them and the Crown. They 
could convert their shares into cash by selling them on the secondary market, 
if they needed liquidity to meet their own obligations. If the Crown did not 
meet its obligations, the Bank, not the individual goldsmiths, was the first 
in line to suffer. Clearly, the Crown had an incentive to ensure that the Bank 
would survive any turmoil.
The role of the Bank of England was further strengthened when it was 
given the monopoly for issuing notes deemed legal tender, which was tied 
to gold, and the power to manage the country’s gold reserves.65 The Bank 
presided over the remarkable feat of maintaining the gold standard even 
as the stock of private money in circulation proliferated.66 The promise to 
redeem notes for cash upon maturity was sufficient to make notes appealing. 
It also gave the Bank some breathing space, because it did not have to pay 
on demand as deposit-taking banks do. Prussia (later Germany) and France, 
the traditional currency debasers, took a much more conservative position 
when it came to private money. Notes and bills had to be fully covered by 
assets to be acceptable in lieu of pay. Clearly this restricted the expansion of 
the (private) monetary base, and by implication, economic growth.67 
The United States followed more closely England’s path, qualified by 
its organization as a federal state and the lack of central banking until 1913. 
Prior to independence, all states borrowed against the future by issuing paper 
money to fund the government, collect taxes, and extend loans to worthy 
individuals or institutions.68 The expenses of the War of Independence left 
most states deeply indebted. Upon integrating the confederate states into 
64 These are, of course, the core features of a corporate entity as they had evolved 
with the large chartered trading corporations, especially the English and Dutch 
East Indian Companies. For the legal history of the Dutch East Indian Company 
in particular, see Guiseppe Dari-Matiacci et al., The Emergence of the Corporate 
Form (2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). On the English East 
India Company, see Ron Harris, The Private Origins of the Private Company: 
Britain 1862-1907, 33 oxFord J. leGAl Stud. 339 (2013).
65 Samuel Knafo, The Gold Standard and the Origins of the Modern International 
Monetary System, 13 rev. pol. econ. 78 (2006) [hereinafter Knafo, Gold]; 
Samuel Knafo, The State and the Rise of Speculative Finance in England, 37 
econ. & Soc’y 172 (2008).
66 Knafo, Gold, supra note 65, at 88.
67 Richard Tilly, Banking in the Early Stages of Industrialization, in bAnkinG in 
the eArly StAteS oF induStriAlizAtion 151 (Rondo Cameron et al. eds., 1967).
68 Richard Sylla et al., Banks and State Public Finance in the New Republic: The 
United States, 1790-1860, 47 J. econ. hiSt. 391 (1987).
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the United States of America, the federation assumed all state debt on the 
condition that states would relinquish their note-issuing authority, which 
they did. States, however, needed to fund themselves. So they turned around 
and authorized state-chartered banks to issue notes. The scheme worked so 
well that many states stopped collecting real estate taxes, because they could 
fund themselves from the business of banking. They either owned shares in 
these banks and collected dividends, or charged them with franchise taxes. 
In some states, revenue from banks amounted to one half, if not more, of 
total state revenue.69 The downside of this scheme, of course, was that the 
failure of banks imposed hardship not only on depositors, other creditors, 
and shareholders, but also on state revenue. Moreover, having relinquished 
their own note-issuing authority, states did not have the power to bail out 
their banks — and so they often crashed. 
Employing banks to help fund fiscal expenditures became increasingly 
attractive to the federal government, especially in times of extraordinary 
expenditures. It is no accident that the system of nationally chartered banks 
was established during the Civil War and that under the relevant legislation 
national banks were required to invest a portion of their capital in federal 
government bonds.70 For this to work, state-chartered banks had to be lured into 
adopting a national charter. The carrot offered was lower reserve requirements 
as compared to state law. When this proved insufficient to increase the number 
of nationally chartered banks, a stick was thrown into the mix in the form of a 
ten percent tax on state bank notes.71 National banks, because of their size and 
status, could pose threats to the stability of the national financial system. This 
ultimately led to the establishment of the Federal Reserve System in 1913. 
States on their part responded to the threat that the national chartering of 
state banks posed to their own state finances by lowering reserve requirements 
and by chartering new forms of financial intermediaries, including investment 
trusts. The stage was set for both funding and regulatory competition between 
the federation and the states on one hand, and among different federal regulators 
on the other. This has been a core feature of the U.S. financial system ever 
69 Id. at 394 (Massachusetts); id. at 395 (Rhode Island); id. at 396 (New York, 
prior to 1830, New Jersey, Pennsylvania); id. at 397 (Delaware); id. at 399 
(Georgia). For other states the share of revenue was lower, but still significant, 
with the exception of Vermont, which hardly derived any income from banks. 
For a comparison of all states, see id. at 401 tbl. 1.
70 Richard Sylla, Federal Policy, Banking Market Structure, and Capital Mobilization 
in the United States, 1863-1913, 29 J. econ. hiSt. 657 (1969); see also chArleS 
w. cAlomiriS & Stephen h. hAber, FrAGile by deSiGn: the politicAl oriGinS 
oF bAnkinG criSeS And ScArce credit (2014).
71 Sylla, supra note 70, at 663.
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since. It has also shaped the development of the global financial system, which 
opened an entirely new field for regulatory arbitrage. 
If all states are beholden to financiers, who in turn rely on states to relax 
their own survival constraints, why are some states better able to assert their 
monetary sovereignty than others? As we have seen in the context of the 
Eurozone crisis, not even all countries that have relinquished their national 
currencies are equal; some are more equal than others. In that context, what 
mattered to secure a position higher up in the hierarchy was the direction of 
capital flows and interest alignment with the monetary authority, the ECB. 
Countries with financial sectors that fueled capital to intermediaries in other 
states did better than those on the receiving end. The same countries also 
benefited from the conservative stance of the ECB with regard to its role as 
a backstop of the integrated financial system. On the other end, countries 
that had been the beneficiaries of capital inflows found themselves in the 
nonviable position of having to absorb losses without benefiting from effective 
backstopping. They had little choice but to impose much of the burden on 
their own people. The ability to do so confirms their territorial sovereignty. 
In this context, it served primarily the monetary interests beyond their shores, 
and not their own people. 
As these examples suggest, monetary sovereignty is not absolute, but 
relative. All depends on where one is located in the global hierarchy of 
moneys. This is not so much a matter of formal agreements among states, 
but of how private money and the entities that issue it relate to the ultimate 
monetary sovereign(s). Once financial stress builds within a nation-state, the 
question arises whether the sovereign has the legal power, and the financial 
as well as political capacity, to step in. If not, then there are two options left 
on the table: external help or internal austerity — and more often than not a 
combination of both, as external help typically comes with strings attached. 
It also means that recovery will be slow and protracted and will entrench the 
country’s position on the periphery of the system.
This raises the question of how the monetary sovereign at the apex of the 
global system sustains itself. The GFC has demonstrated that the U.S. Fed 
was able to more than double its balance sheet after the onset of the crisis 
without any repercussions for the value of the dollar, inflationary pressures, 
or uptake of U.S. debt. To the contrary, the U.S. dollar was widely regarded 
as the safest asset around, and the Fed responded to the demand by making 
state money available to many more. Yet whenever the Fed tries to cut back, 
market volatility increases. 
We have thus come to a point where the credibility of the Fed at the apex 
of the system is maintained by ensuring dollar liquidity. This is not very 
different from the much admonished scheme in Greece where banks fund bad 
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government debt and governments keep banks afloat, only that this scheme 
involves more moneys and more actors and has been scaled to the globe. Private 
moneys depend on state money, and states have become ever more reliant on 
private money not only to fund the state, but to help fuel economic growth. 
The credibility of state money, however, is contingent. The Fed may not be 
able to politically sustain its policies of quantitative easing for long stretches 
of time. The powers of the central bank have been scaled back somewhat 
by the Dodd Frank Act, although these reforms may not stand in the long 
term.72 The irony of such a move would be that political, territorially bounded 
sovereignty would be used to cut the global financial sovereign down to size. 
From the perspective of democratic self-governance, this only makes sense. 
After all, the global monetary sovereign commits the future productivity of 
its country to sustain the system. This comes at huge costs internally, because 
it extends an implicit guarantee to the financial sector.
In the end, we are back in history where it all started. Think of the Fed as 
the Crown, the primary dealers that interact with the Fed as the goldsmiths, 
and the various financial intermediaries as additional layers of goldsmiths that 
issue their own money in the expectation that it can be converted on demand 
into either sovereign debt or dollars. It is a win-win scheme on the upside. 
The problem is that if any of the key players default or retreat, the system 
will invariably destabilize. At that stage, there may not be another backstop 
big enough to stabilize it and, if true, the downward spiral suggested by the 
Law-Finance Paradox would run its full course, bringing down the global 
monetary sovereign with it.
Iv. Money’S challenge to deMocratIc Self-governance
Monetary sovereignty faces challenges from different directions and not all 
pose a threat to democratic self-governance. Sovereign states may delegate 
monetary powers to supranational organizations or multilevel governance 
entities. As long as this is done within existing constitutional constraints and 
does not preempt self-governance about core issues of statehood, it is perfectly 
compatible with self-governance by the demos, the source of sovereignty 
in constitutional democracies.73 Thus, sovereign states may join externally 
72 The official title is the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 929-Z, 124 Stat. 1376, 1871 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o).
73 See cohen, supra note 52.
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managed governance regimes such as the Bretton Woods or the European 
Monetary system74 or swap their own for a common currency, such as the euro. 
As the discussion in this Article suggests, the greatest challenge to monetary 
sovereignty does not emanate from other sovereigns. Rather, the challenge to 
sovereignty emanates from private money issuers, both domestic and foreign. 
The irony (and further proof of the Law-Finance Paradox) is that neither 
modern-day money issuers nor their money would exist absent laws and legal 
institutions that are recognized and enforced by states. Every money private 
entities issue is rooted in legal institutions, such as contract law, property, 
and collateral law. Moreover, the issuers themselves are typically organized 
as corporations or trusts, that is, as creatures of law. These institutions help 
structure rights, giving greater weight to some, and thereby determine the 
enforcement of these rights ex post. Stronger rights trump weaker rights; 
and senior are first in line as compared to junior rights. This works even 
in relation to parties who never participated in the deals that created these 
moneys, because the formal legal devices they employ are backed by coercive 
state power. The enforcing state need not have authorized the entity or the 
issuance of certain assets; all it has to do is to commit that it will recognize 
such entities and assets even if created under foreign law, and will enforce 
them. The shadow of coercive law enforcement by states around the globe 
lends credibility to global money privately.75 
Enforceability allows private parties to trade assets among strangers and 
to scale markets to size. Credible enforcement as such, however, is not a 
guarantee that the promised future pay will be forthcoming or that the assets 
that are used to secure claims will retain their value. In fact, legal protections 
can exacerbate the mismatch between expected and real returns. 
Suppose the making of law, intermediaries and their moneys structured 
in law all happens within a single state. The simple and sensible decisions 
to allow private agents to engage in credit finance and issue their own notes 
will, unless restrained, over time destabilize the financial system.76 To avoid 
a meltdown, the government (directly or through its agents) may be forced to 
intervene by relaxing the full force of the law or offering liquidity where no 
74 A big puzzle about the case law of the German constitutional court is why 
Germany’s participation in these arrangements was never questioned on grounds 
of democratic self-governance. For a critical review of this line of case law, see 
Franz C. Mayer, Rashomon in Karlsruhe: A Reflection on Identity and Democracy 
in the European Union, 9 int’l J. conSt. l. 757 (2011).
75 For a discussion of the shadow of the law and its implications for the distinction 
between law and “non-law,” see Katharina Pistor, Comment, The Law and the 
Non-Law, 27 mich. J. int’l l. 973 (2005).
76 See minSky, supra note 6.
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liquidity is owed. It is within its sovereign powers not to act, but abstention 
is at its own peril. 
Financial meltdowns can topple governments and have done so in the past. 
Consider the relatively recent example of the Suharto regime in Indonesia 
in the context of the East Asian financial crisis, but also the implications 
of Germany’s financial distress in the early 1930s, which helped pave the 
way for the victory and takeover of the state in 1933 by the Nazis.77 Such 
outcomes are not inevitable. One thing, however, is certain: the outcome of 
a meltdown is unpredictable.
Once the decision to intervene has been made, a sovereign state can still 
decide how resources shall be allocated; who should benefit and who should 
lose. Still, in the end, the desire to protect the core of the financial system and 
the state’s own prospects of refinancing its debt will most likely determine the 
outcome. This typically means that the perpetrators of financial instability are 
more likely to win over others. This implies that even within single systems, 
the inherent instability of finance poses a threat to democratic self-governance. 
This threat is built into a system that is an offspring of the original sin of 
large-scale financial systems backed by sovereign states. The best the demos 
can do is to ensure that it never verges towards the abyss. Prevention thus 
appears the best recipe for ensuring democratic control. 
Now assume a transnational money system. It, too, is sustained by law 
and legal institutions, but not of a transnational or global nature. Rather, the 
legal institutions of one or two states can be used to stitch together a global 
money system, as long as other sovereign states recognize the legal rights 
and entities created under those laws. 
Further, suppose that the money issuers sanctioned by one sovereign state 
create havoc in another. Under the Basel Accords and Concordats, which are 
international “soft” law agreements, states owe liquidity protection to entities 
incorporated and licensed under their law. This includes foreign branches, 
but not foreign subsidiaries, which are incorporated in the host state. It is 
therefore possible that a parent bank in country A operates a subsidiary in 
country B, for which country B has to offer liquidity protection. Suppose 
further that country B has no control over capital flowing into or out of the 
country. This is the perfect setup for externalizing the costs of excess money 
creation under the laws of country A while leaving the costs of dealing with 
a crisis to country B. If country B lacks the capacity to stabilize an unstable 
77 For a recollection of this episode, see Ulrich Bindseil & Adalbert Winkler, 
Dual Liquidity Crises Under Alternative Monetary Frameworks — A Financial 
Accounts Perspective (Eur. Cen. Bank, Working Paper No. 1478, 2012). 
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system — as in the case of Ireland discussed earlier — it must rely on outside 
help or apply draconian austerity measures. 
The financial crisis itself is only the final stage of a dynamic that unfolds 
hidden from view. Its structural features include a combination of recognition and 
enforcement of foreign law,78 the opening of borders to foreign intermediaries, 
and no restrictions on free capital flow. Only countries that house intermediaries 
in the business of exporting money can maintain basic principles of democratic 
self-governance, although even these systems are challenged when a crisis 
forces the hand of the sovereign or its agent, the central bank. Countries on 
the receiving end of capital flows, the private moneys issued and disseminated 
under laws they don’t control, are largely helpless. They surrender democratic 
self-governance much earlier than in a crisis situation when they are forced 
to seek outside help. 
In fact, the very operation of the money system is anathema to democratic 
self-governance. Deliberation based on shared normative commitments 
enshrined in constitutional law is at the heart of democratic decision making. 
Money operates according to different rules: competition, hierarchy, and 
power. Money and finance may be made “in” law,79 but their scale and survival 
depends in the last instance on discretionary backstopping. This follows from 
the Law-Finance Paradox, which suggests that binding rules can exacerbate 
a downturn under conditions of fundamental uncertainty. 
It is not impossible to break the spell, but it would take a heroic political 
effort to do so. Two strategies are feasible. One is to let the system crash 
when it reaches the abyss, even at the risk of an economic depression and 
political turmoil, and to rely on the powers of learning and reconstruction. 
The problem with this strategy is that nobody knows what lies ahead at the 
other side of a financial meltdown, the cost of which will undoubtedly be 
borne not by those who benefited most from the system’s upswing, but those 
on the periphery of the system.
The alternative strategy is to backstop the system and protect it from 
self-destruction, but reform it ex post. This is what Minsky advocated80: 
provide liquidity in times of financial turmoil, but invalidate all practices 
that caused it once the crisis has subsided. However, experience shows that 
the very act of “stabilizing an unstable economy” (as suggested by Minsky) 
destroys the political consensus for reform — especially in countries with the 
greatest backstopping capacity. Indeed, regaining stability will be interpreted 
as evidence for the strength of the system, not a sign of necessary reforms.
78 The technical term is “conflict of law rules” or “private international law.”
79 Katharina Pistor, Law in Finance, 41 J. comp. econ. (2013).
80 See minSky, supra note 6, at 219.
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v. concludIng coMMentS
This, then, is the predicament of sovereignty in a world ruled by money. Money 
and monetary sovereignty are not flat, but hierarchical. Countries that lack 
their own currency or access international lending markets only by issuing 
sovereign debt in foreign currencies find themselves at the bottom of the 
hierarchy. Among the handful of countries that retain monetary sovereignty, 
those that come out at the top are the ones ablest and willing to offer a 
helping hand to private money in times of crisis. Countries on the periphery 
are beholden to private money and can at most hope for a helping hand from 
countries at the apex of the system. Yet only those whose stability may pose 
a threat for monetary sovereigns can rely on this help.
In sum, the scope of monetary sovereignty is largely the making of others. It 
thus sits uneasily in a concept of “supreme authority.” Even the country at the 
apex of a global money system is dependent on how much credibility others 
vest in it. This may but need not be the result of specific policy measures a 
country has taken. The greatest challenge to sovereignty and to democratic 
self-governance comes from the fact that countries can lose it without any fault 
on their part, and they lose it first to private actors over which they have no or 
little control and then to their home countries or the multilateral organizations 
they largely control. The best safeguard against such a predicament is to 
practice monetary autarchy, an isolationist stance that is not very attractive. 
Neither, however, is the perspective to be pushed to the periphery of a system 
controlled by others who will further entrench their position at the top with 
every future crisis. 
